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The relation between bibliometrics and science policy remains underdeveloped. Relevance of 
new methods to produce indicators is easily claimed, but often without real insight in the policy 
processes. Drawing on experiences with the use of S&T indicators in science policy in the 
Netherlands and on principal-agent theory, I develop an analytical perspective which enables to 
assess the role of S&T indicators in science policy. It is argued that the use of S&T indicators can 
only be understood well if one takes the socio- political context with its specific dynamics and 
rationalities into account. 
1. Introduction 
Many bibliometric studies make reference to possible use of the method or the 
results in science policy. Often studies are explicitly policy-driven. Nevertheless, few 
studies on S&T indicators pay attention to the dynamics of science policy, the specific 
information need of policy makers, and whether S&T indicators can provide this 
information. Nor do they assess effects of S&T indicators on the interactions between 
the actors in science policy. The references to science policy regularly take for granted 
that governments or other funders of research can improve their research strategy just 
by translating the results of S&T indicator studies in policy measures. The dependency 
of formulation, implementation, and of the success of such strategies on other actors in 
the research system is neglected. 
The use of S&T indicators within science policy should not be looked upon as 
something what is done by individual policy makers or evaluators, but instead as 
something done within specific socio-political configurations. Science policy is a 
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control system. Using a mix of allocation, stimulation, and accounting systems, science 
policy makers try to control own research programmes and the resources og others to 
enable these programmes - whether they are at the government level, within research 
councils, at universities, or are entrepreneurial scientists (Zeldenrust, l Van der Meulen 
and Rip2). Governments and research councils initiate priority programmes and draw in 
the research competencies of scientists and their laboratories to enable the programmes. 
Scientists develop research lines and bid for grants and contracts to raise sufficient 
money to keep their own research going. Actual science policy is the outcome of 
complex interactions between different actors with partially conflicting, partially 
congruent as well as complementary interests (Mayntz and ScharpJ). 3 
The complexity of the interactions makes it difficult to analyze the effect of S&T 
indicators on the policy process. They seem to be only a few more trees in the forest of 
information used by each of the actors in the policy network. But, we can look. at the 
specific purposes of S&T indicators as policy information and to the kind of 
relationships they affect. In most countries, the primary functions of S&T indicators are 
monitoring and evaluation as aspects of the relation between the government or an 
intermediate body and research organisations or parts of them. We can conceptualize 
this relation as a principal-agent relation and use principal-agent theory to understand 
the virtues and effects of S&T indicators in science policy. The relation captures the 
information asymmetry that seems to be a primary reason for governments (as 
principals) to encourage the production of S&T indicators. 
2. The policy context of S&T indicators 
Principal-agent relations, basically, are relations between actors in which one actor, 
the principal, transfers resources to one or more other actors, the agents, who should 
use these resources to realize objectives of the principal that the principal herself cannot 
realize. One can think of numerous of this kind of contract-like relations. Of these, 
principal-agent relations are typified by four important characteristics: 
- Agents have their own (professional) objectives and interests, which might 
conflict or only partially overlap with those of the principal. The resources of the 
principal can be used to satisfy the agent's objectives and interests. Often this possibility 
is a main reason for an agent to enter into the principal-agent relation. Thus, the 
principal and the agent have a conflict of interest, which can be solved (from the 
perspective of the principal) by structuring the relation, for example, by rewards for 
performances, control, and monitoring. 
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- An impediment to the structuring of the relation is the information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent. Without additional action, the principal acks the 
competence or the information to judge what is sensible to do in order to realize the 
objectives. Moreover, she often depends on the agents for such judgements. Science 
policy is an obvious example of this, as scientists are often the leading advisors of 
governments on science policy issues. 
- The principal has the right to monitor, but has little possibilities to do so. One 
reason is the lack of appropriate information on the activities of the agents. Monitoring 
systems imply additional costs, and self-reporting by the agents is unreliable without 
further incentives. Thus, the principal has to find an efficient monitoring or incentive 
system which is sufficiently effective and has acceptable costs. Within science policy 
an attractive option is to make use of the interests cientists have to evaluate other 
scientists, because they are consumers of each other's products. 
- The impossibility of complete monitoring implies that the principal has to trust 
the agent. Especially in long standing principal-agent relations trust is necessary for 
stability and continuity. Within long standing relations with incomplete monitoring 
reciprocal trust of the agent in the principal is important as well. Agents are likely to 
continue good performance if they can rely on rewards for good performance, like 
continuation or increase of funding or a certain degree of autonomy. 
Funding relations in science have always been characterized by a secure balance 
between autonomy and trust on the one side, and accountability and performance on the 
other. What has changed, however, is the relative importance of the characteristics and 
the institutionalization f funding relations. If we can use, with hindsight, the idea of 
science policy for the early periods of science, science policy systems have grown from 
'a set of dyadic relations between patrons and clients, each of them unique' (Westfall 4) 
via trust-based systems in which funding relations are mediated by research councils 
and other funding agencies operating mainly by peer review (Turner 5) to present-day 
science policy in which control and monitoring practices proliferate (Cozzens et al. 6). 
Since governments have exercised more interest in the products of science as a 
direct input in the advancement of society, economy, and industry, their position as a 
principal has developed. At the same time, science policies have emerged in which 
independency of control has become vital for maintaining the relationship between the 
principal and the agent. As a result there is now a role for professional evaluators, 
science policy studies and for producers of S&T indicators. 
Principal-agent relations are analyzed within neo-institutional economic analyses of 
organisations or in policy studies of the relation between governments and agencies or 
other organisations performing functions for the government. The four characteristics 
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are translated into the question which monitoring or incentive structure makes agents 
conform best to the interests and objectives of the principal. From this perspective the 
emergence of S&T indicators can be explained from the need to improve control and 
shifting the information asymmetry more in favour of the principal (Note 1). 
From a policy perspective the focus on the design of incentive structures is 
intelligible. But it neglects the actions and strategies of agents to convince principals of 
the value of their objectives. Such actions and strategies are part of the development of
science policy systems and cannot be ignored when analyzing the role of S&T 
indicators in science policy. In a sociological explanation of principal-agent relations, 
principal and agent are complemented with third parties. The principal-agent relation is 
a result of differentiation of functions or systems, which however emain dependent on 
each other for resources. New actors enter to mediate the relation in order to keep the 
functions eparated while establishing the connection. The result is a principal-agent 
configuration i which the dynamics of the relation between principal and agent depend 
on interactions with the third party. 
Braun 9 has used this model to study the development of funding agencies in several 
countries. The relation between government and funding agencies is highly affected by 
the socializing effect of the participation of scientists within the processes of the 
funding agencies (e.g., peer review, research programming). In a study on disciplinary 
evaluation committees in the Netherlands Van der Meulen t0 has conceptualized the 
configuration between government, evaluation committee and discipline as a triplet of 
principal-agent relations. The evaluation committee temporarily mediates the ongoing 
relation between government and the discipline and works as an agent of both the 
government and the discipline. 
Three functions of S&T indicators can be distinguished if we look at the effect of 
indicators on the principal-agent relation (Van der Meulen27). First, S&T indicators 
increase the competence of principals to control. S&T indicators provide structured 
information about performances, that often can be interpreted by the principal itself. 
(Note 2). Second, they focus the control to those aspects of the performance of agents 
that can be indicated by the S&T indicators. Third, they structure the relation between 
the principal and the agents. Objectives of the principal and the desired performance of
the agents can be formulated more specifically. 
If their are several functions, the question is which function will dominate in which 
context~ how certain functions mature in certain contexts and how S&T indicators can 
be modelled towards certain functions. A first step towards answers on these question is 
an analysis of the dynamics of S&T indicators in policy contexts. Three cases of the use 
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of S&T indicators in the Netherlands are presented below. The use of S&T indicators is 
related irectly to the dynamics of the relevant principal-agent configuration. 
3. S&T indicators in Dutch science policy: three cases 
In the Netherlands, the government plays an important role in the development of
bibliometric methods and indicators, and their use in science policy. Wouters 12 has 
shown that the advancement of the use of S&T indicators is linked to the objectives of 
the Dutch government to improve the decision processes in science policy and to 
develop a science policy in which the functioning of the system was important, rather 
than that of individual organisations, research groups or scientists. But this is true only 
when focussing on governmental policies. S&T indicators in general have been 
implemented more broadly in Dutch science policy and the government has stimulated 
this (Van Steenl3). One can distinguish four different activities by which S&T 
indicators enter into science policy in the Netherlands: 
1. The production of a biannual S&T Indicators Report. S&T indicator eports 
were produced irregularly in the eighties. After a pilot in 1991, produced by the 
Ministries of Education and Sciences and of Economic Affairs, a new series started in 
1994, produced by the Netherlands Observatory of Science and Technology. 14,15 
2. Ad hoc bibliometric studies produced for specific evaluation purposes. 
Although the evaluations are not organised by the government any more, some of the 
bibliometric studies are still financed by the government as a subsidy to improve 
evaluations, themselves seen as a necessary condition for the well-functioning research 
systems. An example is the biology disciplinary evaluation which was accompagnied 
by a citation analysis. 16 
3. Ad hoc indicator studies for certain policy issues. Most of these studies are 
financed by the government, but also by others. An influential example is Irvine et al.!s 
study, Investing in the Future, which was extensively quoted by the government in the 
Science Budget 1991 (Irvine et al. 17). 
4. Background studies to develop new bibliometric methods, especially on 
mapping new developments and social networks in science and technology and on the 
development of indicators for socio-economic relevance of research. Examples are the 
studies of the Leiden Centre for Science and Technology Studies on the development of
social and behavioral sciences (Nederhof 18) and on mapping integrated science and 
technology networks (Korevaar et al. 19). 
We will discuss examples of the first three kind activities and assess the use of 
results of S&T indicator studies and how this relates to the dynamics of Dutch science 
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policy. Results of the fourth kind of activities are in general too explorative to be used 
directly within policy, although the reports do circulate within policy circuits. 
3. I. National R&D investments 
Since 1991, the S&T Indicators reports how the Dutch investments in science have 
decreased as a percentage of GDP from 1987 onwards. The decline is mainly due to 
reduction of investments in Dutch R&D activities by some major multi-national firms, 
with corporate laboratories in the Netherlands. Government investments also show a 
slight decrease. The typical curve which visualizes this finding can be found in several 
advisory reports and has become a symbol for those worrying about the health of the 
Netherlands research system (Fig. 1). 
The first signals of the decrease can be found in the 1991 S&T Indicator Report 
(Ministry of Education and Sciences (MES) and Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEA). 2~ But the report gives the investment figures until 1989, so at that time it 
seems to be a two years decrease only. The accompanying text mentions the decrease in 
these two years is largest in the Netherlands (from about 2.3 % to 2.1% ), but continues 
'the Netherlands had still a relatively good position among countries of medium size'. 
In subsequent years the decrease continues to about 1.8% in 1993. In the 1994 S&T 
Indicator Report 14 it is concluded that the Netherlands has lost contact with countries 
like Japan, US and Gen-nany, and has to compete with 'followers' like Norway, 
Finland, Belgium, and the UK. These figures are undisputed at the government level 
but, at that time, explicitly put in context. It is stressed that one cannot simply interpret 
the figures at face value. The Dutch economic infrastructure, of which the service 
sector is an important pillar, has to be taken into account. The nature of the service 
sector implies a low level of R&D investments. Also the low level of defense R&D 
would legitimate lower overall R&D investments (see for example: Refs 21, 22). 
However, in the Science Budget 1995, 23 restoring the R&D investments as a 
percentage of GDP to an acceptable vel is formulated as one of the objectives of S&T 
policy in the next years. The central message of this Science Budget is that links 
between public research and the private sectors hould be increased. Instead of being a 
matter to be put in context, the decrease of R&D investments i  now presented as a real 
risk towards a strong economy. Especially industry has to be stimulated to increase its 
investments in public research. 
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Fig. 1. R&D expenditures in the Netherlands a % of GDP (1981-1993) 
- -  Total expenditures; ........... Government; ............. Industry 
For the indicators on national R&D investments this translation is crucial. At first 
they were linked within the government-science relation to the governmental spending 
on research. Now the government has linked them to the industry and its relation with 
(public) science. From a debatable figure within a long standing principal- agent 
relation, they have become an established political fact - but in a still maturing relation 
between industry and public science. 
3.2. Relative allocation of resources 
Of the ad-hoc studies presenting S&T Indicators, Investing in the Future (Irvine 
et al. 17) is among the most influential one. The study compares the allocation o f  
resources in six countries, the U.S, the U.K., Germany, France, Japan and the 
Netherlands. Allocation figures are broken down to funding categories, to categories of  
research and to fields of  research. One of the results is that as percentage of total 
allocations, the Netherlands pend relatively more on arts and humanities, professional 
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studies, social sciences, physical sciences and less on technical sciences, life sciences, 
environmental sciences and mathematics (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Allocation of government resources to areas of research, 1987 
UK FRG FRA NET US JAP Average 
Engineering sciences 15.6 12.5 11.2 11.7 13.2 21.6 14.3 
Physical sciences 20.2 25.1 28.7 21.7 15.6 14.5 21.2 
Environmental sciences 6.7 4.5 5.3 2.8 5.8 3.7 4.8 
Maths and computing 7.5 3.9 5.4 3.5 4.0 2.3 4.4 
Life sciences 30.9 36.7 34.7 32.7 48.9 33.7 36.3 
Social sciences 6.7 5.2 4.6 10.4 5.1 3.9 6.0 
Professional nd vocational 5.7 5.0 2.1 8.5 3.3 9.9 5.8 
Arts and humanities 6.6 6.2 6.8 8.6 2.8 9.6 6.8 
Multidiseiplinary 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.8 0.6 
Total expenditures (1987 MS) 2798 4037 3212 958 12904 3736 100% 
Source: Ref. 17, p. 219. 
In their final chapter lrvine et al. 17 warn against hasty interpretations of the 
findings: 
'lt is necessary to sound a strong note of caution concerning the accuracy of the 
data reported in this volume. As was apparent in every country chapter, these 
questions of statistical reliability are central in setting limits on  the conclusions 
that can be legitimately drawn.' (p.207-208) 
Of the 21 sets of data used for the six countries that were assessed, only three were 
labelled good, the others 'reasonable reliable' or 'fair only'. But 'even if data were 
labelled 'good" they are invariably still subject to a degree of uncertainty.' (lrvine 
et al. 17 p. 209). 
In the Science Budget 1991, the Dutch government extensively cites from the 
study. 24 Ten pages are used to present the main findings and interpreting the results of 
this study. Especially the findings on the relative allocation of resources to research 
areas are emphasized. The Science Budget 1991 notes that science policy is regularly 
confronted with the question how much should be relatively spent on physical sciences, 
engineering sciences and life sciences, on social sciences and behavioural sciences, and 
on arts and humanities. The formulation is subtle and according to the original in the 
Science Budget. It suggests the six areas can be reduced to three. The conclusions are 
subtle as well. The limitations in the data mentioned by Irvine et al. makes the 
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government to conclude that better figures and additional analyses are needed. These 
analyses hould be provided in a foresight process. Nevertheless, atthe same time the 
government concludes allocation to the natural, engineering and life sciences hould be 
increased. 
But the results have a short life cycle. Although the issue of budget allocations 
remains vividly, the debate concentrates on how government can force changes in 
budget allocations within universities. A new system of university funding is 
implemented, which intends to increase somewhat the discretion of the government 
over the internal university allocation of research funding. But implementing priorities 
by direct intervention i  the universities turns out to be problematic. In its Science 
Budget 1993 21 the government mentions eight areas that have to be reinforced by the 
universities. The universities and university departments cooperate and make plans or 
show that such reinforcement has been effected already. Disciplinary committees 
coordinate the plans and guide the implementation process. Due course the government 
has lost sight on it and can only at an abstract level monitor whether priorities were 
realised. A shift has been made from priorities to processes. 
In addition, a foresight process is initiated to provide more information about the 
relative importance of different research areas. The foresight process was delegated to 
an ad-hoc committee. The main tasks of the committee are to initiate foresight 
processes and to advise the government on the outcomes. After some internal pilot 
studies the committee concludes that doing foresight studies on selected topics is more 
fruitful than a holistic foresight process aiming at comparing areas, e.g. physical 
sciences with social sciences. Within the focused studies possible linkages between 
socio-economic objectives and scientific possibilities can be explored more in detail 
(Van der Meulen 25). The final report of the committee mentions priority themes instead 
of priority fields or disciplines. 26 
The international figures on allocation of research funds found their way easily to 
science policy and became part of the relationship between government and univer- 
sities. However the shifts made in this relationship from priorities to processes and from 
priority disciplines to priority themes, reduced their policy relevance significantly. 
3.3. Disciplinary evaluation committees 
Since about 1992, university research is evaluated in an enrolling five year scheme. 
Each discipline is evaluated every five year. The evalautions are organised by the 
Association of Dutch Universities and done by international evaluation committees. A 
stringent protocol defines the organisation of the evaluation process, the information the 
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universities have to provide and the criteria the committee should use. The use of  
bibliometric indicators is common practice for these committees. Publications data are 
an obligatory part of  the information the universities have to provide about the research 
programmes. All evaluation committees report hese figures, and productivity is used as 
one of the dimensions to assess performance. In general, there is hardly any dispute on 
the value of these data and on their interpretation. 
This was not the case in the eighties. At that time, such committees were organized 
by the Ministry of  Education and Sciences. Committees were installed ad hoc, in those 
fields where government or research organisations perceived opportunities or major 
problems e.g. severe budget reductions. While the government promoted the use of 
bibliometric indicators by these committees, such methods were far from accepted 
practice. Discussion was about what indicators should be used, how they should be 
used, who should use them and how to interpret them. In all comments on the 
distinctive reports the use of  indicators appeared prominently. 
Table 2 
S&T indicators used by evaluation committees in the eighties 
Evaluation Science indicators Comments 
committee RAWB ZWO KNAW Universities 
Biochemistry Number of citations positive negative negative negative 
fellowships; methodological 
contributions) 
Biology Number of publications negative negative posit ive negative 
(know how, infrastructure) 
Economics Number of publications negative negative negative negative 
Theology Number of publications positive posit ive posit ive positive 
Table 2 (Van der Meulen 27) lists the kind of  indicators used by four of these 
evaluation committees in the 1980s. One committee used numbers of  citations and 
some other additional indicators to assess performance. Three others, biology, 
economics and theology, used numbers of  publications. Within the table are also listed 
the responses of  main actors within the Dutch research system on these methods. At the 
governmental level the then Advisory Council for Science Policy (RAWB) was asked 
to pay specific attention to the method used by the evaluation committee in its 
comments. It reacted positively on the use of  citations and on the publication counting 
by the committee for theology. The Netherlands Research Council (ZWO), the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of  Arts and Sciences (KNAW) and the Universities were all 
negative on the use of  citations. With respect o the use of  publications they were all 
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negative as well in the case of the economy evaluation and all positive in the case of the 
theology evaluation. Opinions diverged in the case of the biology evaluation. The 
research council responded positively. Like the advisory council, the Academy and the 
universities responded negatively. 
Within science policy in these days there was no accepted scientometric method and 
no dominant opinion on these methods. In a study on the use of indicators by these 
committees Van der Meulen 27 concluded that the acceptance of the indicators depended 
on acceptance of the conclusions. A crucial issue in the responses was whether the 
committee had indeed assessed the main problems the disciplines faced with. 
Sometimes these problems were on the level o f  budget reductions and selection of 
priorities. Other disciplines faced new relations with society or unbalanced 
developments of subdisciplines. Actors that agreed with the disciplinary evaluation 
committee about he main problems, responded positively on the indicators used. Those 
who saw rather different problems tressed the inappropriateness of the indicators used 
to deal with these problems or rejected them even firmer when the assessment seem to 
enlarge the problem (e.g., centralistic intervention). 
The debate has been closed now on two levels. The practice of using bibliometric 
methods for assessing research groups and departments has become codified within the 
protocols. The indicators are used, even when there is no urgency for a bibliometric 
analysis or when the discipline lacks a codified publication practice to validate the 
interpretation of the indicators. The debate as a process has also been closed. In the 
eighties reports were sent to actors for advice and the government responded officially. 
Presently, reports are sent to the main bodies in the research system just to inform them. 
Universities are expected to respond by implementing the outcomes. So, instead of 
being part of a highly conflicting policy relation between government and science, 
dominated by budget restrictions and doubts about performances, the indicators are 
now part of the management practices of universities. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
It is interesting to contrast the two areas of science policy in the Netherlands in the 
way bibliometrics are used: monitoring and evaluation. From a scientometric point of 
view, governmental science policy seems to be characterized by opportunistic use, 
misuse and sometimes abuse of bibliometric data. The evaluation procedures are 
characterized - from the scientometric point of view - by interpretation of bibliometric 
indicators by knowledgeable people. But that is a too easy criticism, neglecting the 
specific rationality, call it 'political rationality', of science policy. 
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In order to understand the effects and uses of S&T indicators they should be related 
to the socio-political context in which they are used. Therefore I have introduced the 
notion of principal-agent configurations as a returning configuration i  science policy, 
especially when it concerns S&T indicators. The analyses of the use of S&T indicators 
in science policy can then be broken down into three steps. First, the identification of 
the principal-agent configuration i  which the indicators will be used. The second step 
is to analyze how bibliometric indicators affect he (socio-political) relations within the 
configuration: The last step is to add the time dimension, and analyze the dynamics of 
the principal-agent configuration. 
In the ease of disciplinary evaluation committees the configuration consists of the 
relation between government as a principal, the discipline as a community of agents and 
the evaluation committee as a temporary, mediating third party. The indicators improve 
the capability of the committee to evaluate. With respect o the main principal-agent 
relation in the configuration, the relation between government and the discipline, the 
position of the government is strengthened. The indicators empower the principal to 
form a legitimate opinion on the performance of the agents and on the validity of the 
assessments of the disciplinary evaluation committee. At least that was the situation in 
the 1980s. 
The institutionalisation f the evaluation committees by the Association of Dutch 
Universities differentiates 'evaluation' as a separate function of science policy. The 
committees now become an agent of both disciplines and government. The result is a 
complex principal-agent configuration in which the discipline is both agent of the 
government and a partial principal of the committee. The relation between committee 
and government is mediated by the Association of Dutch University. (Note 3). The 
differentiation implies a stabilization of evaluation practices and a possibility for 
bibliometric methods to become part of the evaluative repertoire. But the differentiation 
has its costs as well. Because of the differentiation of the evaluation function from 
science policy, its effects on other functions of science policy are minimized. In 
contrast with the results of the committees in the 1980s, results of the present evaluation 
committees are hardly adopted in science policy. Thus, the role of the S&T indicators 
for evaluation has grown, but at the same time their impact decreased. 
In the two cases on S&T indicators used in the Science Budgets of the government 
the main principal-agent relation is the one between the political system and the 
scientific system or the university system. Science policy as it was developed in the 
Ministry of Education and Sciences, mediates between these two. Indicators on 
investments are used to inform the principal about he performance of the agent, and to 
legitimate the mediation: i.e., science policy. The fate of the bibliometric indicators is 
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closely related to the way in which science policy tries to combine and optimize the 
functions of the political system and the scientific system. The indicators serve to 
translate objectives and interests from the one system to the other. 
In the case of national R&D investments he indicators first sensitize the political 
system to the development of the scientific system and the possible problems a decline 
might have. Acceptability of the indicators is increased by putting them in context. 
Later on, indicators can speak for themselves and become an accepted fact within the 
political discussion on S&T policy. In the second case the indicators on relative budget 
allocations were used to translate the objective of the political system, i.e. to optimize 
allocation and increase the economic benefits of science, to objectives for the science 
system. However, the translation of this objective is done in another way as well: with a 
new university funding scheme and the introduction of a foresight process. These two 
changes affect the principal-agent relation. The science system develops means to cope 
with the objective of the political system to increase selectivity in a way the indicators 
lose their significance. 
It is easy to be.cynical or frustrated about how S&T indicators are used, misused 
and abused in science policy. Especially, if one supposes that these indicators are 
worthwhile and proper use is prevented by the irrationalities of policy makers. 
However, bibliometric data do not just emerge in a scientific market in which scientists 
win or lose according to their talents and reputation, nor in a despotic state in which a 
government rules with crude indicators and arbitrariness. They are part of complex 
authority configurations in which agents try to mediate between actors who 
(selectively) fund and promote science and the scientists. 
What is the added value if we look upon the use of S&T indicators in this way? Can 
we now make better indicators and be more sure about proper use? Not automatically. 
With hindsight we can make a kind of mechanical nalysis, but designers and producers 
of indicators have to look forwards. Definitely, the third step, adding the dynamic of the 
configuration to the analysis, introduces a major uncertainty. The configurations 
depend not only on the S&T indicators but have other dimensions as well. 
However, let me conclude by giving three indications how a context analysis might 
be useful in the design and production S&T indicators. The first is that context analysis 
shows that those who will use the reports are not always the direct clients. In 
evaluations for instance, the evaluation committee seems to be the primary client. But if 
the indicators are presented in a separate report, a government, or another esearch 
funder will be interested in the outcomes as well. Even if evaluation committees do not 
use the indicators, the bibliometric study can have its use for the relation between the 
government and its agents. 
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Similarly, the circle of customers can be reduced deliberatedly by adjusting the 
indicators and their representations to the information eed and capacity of one actor 
only. Science policy at a government level can handle S&T indicators only at great 
level of abstraction (e.g. disciplines, sectors or kind of institutions). Within 
management practices much more detailed analyses are needed, e.g. on the level of 
programmes, projects or even persons. Analyses of the policy context of indicator use 
paves the way to tailor made S&T indicators (Katz28). 
Definitely, the provision of such data empowers actors with monitoring and control 
capacities. It is of course an important issue which actors should be empowered and 
with what capacity. Producers of S&T indicators can not evade this question and being 
just responsive to market demands. A critical reflection on what good S&T policies are 
and how S&T indicators hould contribute to these is needed. An essential part of such 
reflection is a good understanding of the configuration in which indicators are used, 
which indicators can be taken up, and how they can affect strategies of all actors. 
Notes 
1. It is significant that groups in the UK and the Netherlands have played a major role in the development 
of performance indicators at a time when research policy in these countries was characterised bybudget 
restrictions and assessments (Martin and Irvine, 7 Moed et al. 8). 
2. Producers of S&T indicators tend to overemphasize the necessity of asking peers about the 
interpretation. First, by structuring the information i  a certain way, they give part of the interpretation 
themselves. Second, a lot of S&T indicators are build on a level of aggregation that is beyond the usual 
scope of peers. 
3. Note that when complex configurations stabilize over time, actors often do not perceive the basic 
relations any more. The dependencies and accountability become apparent again only when the main 
function of the configuration, in this case 'evaluation', is disputed. Recently, the Dutch government 
dismissed an evaluation of educational programs in physics at universities, because it was too much a 
defense of the discipline. The affair brought into light again that these evaluations are not just done to 
serve the university management, but also to show accountability othe government. 
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